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ABSTRACT
Does emphasizing the pandemic as a partisan issue polarize factual beliefs,
attitudes, and behavioral intentions concerning the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19
pandemic? To answer this question, we conducted a preregistered survey
experiment with a “questions as treatment” design in late March 2020 with
1587 U.S. respondents recruited via Prime Panel. Respondents were randomly
assigned to answer several questions about then-president Donald J. Trump
and the coronavirus (including receiving an information cue by evaluating
one of Trump’s tweets) either at the beginning of the survey (treated
condition) or at the end of the survey (control condition). Receiving these
questions at the beginning of the survey had no direct effect on COVID-19
factual beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 27 September 2020; Accepted 21 March 2021
Introduction
Governments around the world struggled to fully contain the COVID-19
pandemic in its early stages. Case and fatality counts suggest the U.S.
response was particularly poor in this early phase. During this period,
President Trump advocated against a number of policies designed to
slow the spread of the novel coronavirus (e.g. “lockdowns” or stay-at-
home orders), often by focusing on the negative economic conse-
quences of such measures. At both the federal and state levels, clear
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partisan differences emerged over which side to privilege in a delicate
balance between protecting public health or the economy. The presi-
dent additionally made a number of false statements about the corona-
virus, most notably concerning possible cures (Farley and Kiely 2020;
McDonald 2020).
Given the ability of partisan cues to polarize the electorate (Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Nicholson 2012), we conducted a simple
survey experiment to examine the extent to which attitudes, factual beliefs,
and behavioral intent about the pandemic can be (further) polarized along
partisan lines. Respondents were randomly assigned either to a treatment
condition (receiving five questions designed to present COVID-19 as a parti-
san issue at the beginning of a survey) or a control condition (receiving these
same five questions at the end of the survey). These questions focused on
Trump and his administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic,
including providing a clear cue to respondents by asking them to evaluate
a tweet where Trump stated “THE CURE CANNOT BE WORSE THAN THE
PROBLEM”. Our preregistered expectation was that receiving these “ques-
tions as treatment” at the beginning of the survey would present the
nascent pandemic as a partisan issue, thus increasing partisan differences
on COVID-19 factual beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. Theoreti-
cally, our expectations derive from previous work that shows that in an
environment with high distrust of opposing parties and partisans (Iyengar
and Westwood 2015; Carlin and Love 2013), raising the salience of partisan-
ship could provoke further group alignment (Klar 2013; Nicholson 2012) that,
in turn, polarizes responses. Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence
that our treatment increased polarization along partisan lines, a finding that
aligns with other articles from this special issue (Myers 2021; Gadarian,
Goodman, and Pepinsky 2021).
Method
Participants
We fielded our study March 27-31, 2020 with U.S. respondents recruited
from Prime Panels (Chandler et al. 2019) using the Qualtrics survey plat-
form.1 To ensure balance across different partisan groups, we used the
quota function to request at least 500 Republicans, 500 Democrats,
and 500 Independents. (All analyses that follow define party identifi-
cation from the standard ANES 7-point scale asked in the survey, with
leaners assigned as partisans.) After excluding participants who did
not respond to any of the outcome measures, a final sample of 1587
1Our preregistration can be found on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at osf.io/hquga
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participants remained (47% male, 73.3% Caucasian, 47.7% college edu-
cated, Mage = 41.43, SDage = 14.99).
Procedure and materials
After giving consent, respondents were asked standard party identification
(ANES 7-point scale) and ideology questions. Using the randomization feature
within Qualtrics, participants were then assigned either to the treatment or
control condition. Those in the treatment condition were asked five questions
about Trump and the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic
before responding to our outcome measures. The goal of these “questions as
treatment” was to emphasize and cue the Trump administration’s approach
and handling of the coronavirus pandemic. These five questions were asked
at the end of the survey for those in the control condition. Finally, participants
completed some demographic information and were debriefed.2
Questions as treatment
Our treatment consists of five questions. First, respondents were asked to answer
“[g]enerally speaking, would you say that the TrumpAdministration’s response to
the coronavirus pandemic has been” on a 5-point scale frommuch too strong (1)
to about right (3) tomuch too weak (5). Next, respondents rated Donald Trump on
an 11-point (0–10) feeling thermometer. Respondents were then asked to agree
or disagree with President Trump’s tweet from 24March 2020 (see Figure 1) on a
5-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
Respondents were asked on a 5-point Likert scale whether they agreed or
disagreed with the following statements: “The main reason we are seeing so
many coronavirus cases and deaths in the U.S. is because the Trump Admin-
istration failed to use the last few months in which the coronavirus spread in
Asia and then in Italy to prepare for the outbreak in the U.S.” and “Concern
about the coronavirus is completely blown out of proportion.”
As expected and shown in Figure 2, we observed strong partisan differences
in these five measures. Responses of all three partisan groups differed signifi-
cantly from each other (ps < .001). Not surprisingly, Republicans showed signifi-
cantly higher levels of support for Trump and his administration’s response to
the pandemic than Democrats. Furthermore, for four of the five treatment
questions, there was no difference in participants’ mean responses between
those asked at the beginning of the survey versus those at the end (ps > .6).3
2This survey also included additional measures and orthogonal experimental manipulations not reported
here.
3Respondents who saw the treatment questions at the end of the survey expressed slightly warmer feel-
ings towards Trump (control condition: M = 5.22, SD = 3.94; treated condition: M = 4.83, SD = 3.91), t
(1570) = 1.97, p = .049). This difference is concentrated among independents and is likely statistical
noise. Further this difference score is non-significant for Republican and Democrats, but significant
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Figure 1. President Trump’s Tweet from 24 March 2020.
Figure 2. Response means for Democrats and Republicans on “Questions as Treatment”
items. Notes: All items scaled 0–1 to facilitate comparisons across dependent variables.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. This figure only reports data from respondents
in the treatment condition (those who received these questions at the beginning of the
survey).
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Outcome measures
To gauge the extent to which our "questions as treatment" emphasizing par-
tisanship affected attitudes about the coronavirus, we asked respondent
several questions. First, we asked how scared respondents were of different
potential consequences of the coronavirus on a 7-point scale from not at
all scared (1) to extremely scared (7), α = .84. We also asked respondents to
report their opinion about public health vs. economic trade-offs on a 7-
point scale from only concerned about protecting public health (1) to only con-
cerned about protecting the U.S. economy (7).
Respondents answered three factual belief questions about the corona-
virus on a 5-point scale from definitely false (1) to definitely true: “Experts
advise against using ibuprofen if you think you might be infected with the
coronavirus”, “The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved
chloroquine specifically for the treatment of patients with COVID-19” and
“People can transmit the virus even if they do not show any symptoms.”
To assess respondents’ behavioral intentions towards the coronavirus
safety precautions, we asked them about their personal agency in minimizing
the spread of the virus on a 7-point scale (“I believe that I can help prevent
deaths by staying at home” and “By staying at home I can help slow down
the spread of the virus so that we can avoid too many people being sick at
the same time and our hospitals not being able to help them all”, r(1584)
= .64.), on which higher scores indicated higher personal agency. Further-
more, respondents indicated their compliance with stay-at-home measures
on a 5-point scale from not at all likely to extremely likely (5).
Results
Does emphasizing Trump increase polarization?
To test our preregistered expectation that placing questions at the beginning
of the survey that emphasize partisan differences would increase partisan
differences on later items, we conducted OLS regressions on all outcome
measures with the covariates (age, gender, race, college education, and fol-
lowing politics), the treatment (0 = control condition, 1 = treatment con-
dition), partisanship (dummy coded: Democrats = reference category), and
their interactions as predictors.4 Contrary to our expectation, we found no
significant interaction effects between Republicans and the treatment
(versus Democrats as the reference category).5
for independents (control condition: M = 5.06, SD = 3.46; treated condition: M = 3.89, SD = 3.47), t
(1566) = 2.86, p = .049, Tukey adjusted.
4The full models can be found in Appendix B (Table 2).
5Across all the models, we only observe a single significant partisan interaction: Independents x treat-
ment when chloroquine is the outcome variable; b =−0.70, SE = 0.22, p = 0.001.
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Next, we computed the marginal effects across all three-party identifi-
cations using the R-package margins (Leeper, Arnold, and Arel-Bundock
2020). The marginal effects of the treatment as well as the effect of treat-
ment for the total sample along with their 95% confidence intervals are
visualized in Figure 3. The non-significant effect of the treatment overall
does not appear to mask countervailing effects among different partisan
groups. Not only do we find that the effects of the treatment do not
differ between partisan groups, but that the overall point estimate of the
treatment is very near zero.
Figure 3. Marginal effects of the treatment condition across party identification. Notes:
Marginal effects of questions as treatment for Democrats, Republicans, Independents as
well as the total sample. The models control for covariates (age, gender, race, college
education, and following politics). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Partisan differences
While our manipulation did not increase polarization in attitudes, beliefs, and
behavioral intentions surrounding the pandemic, the extent of partisan differ-
ence is itself intriguing. Figure 4 shows the control group’s mean response to
our outcome measures along with their 95% confidence intervals.6 The items
are presented in order of the size of the partisan gap – the item with the
Figure 4. Mean differences between Democrats and Republicans in the outcome
measures. Notes: Scaled mean levels by partisanship of the outcome measures for par-
ticipants in the control condition. All items scaled 0–1 to facilitate comparisons across
dependent variables. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
6All results reported in Figure 4 hold true for the entire sample and when including an indicator for the
treatment condition as well as covariates (see Appendix B, Table 3).
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largest partisan gap is presented first (chloroquine is FDA approved) and the item
with the smallest partisan gap is presented last (belief in asymptomatic trans-
mission). Compared to the treatment questions reported above, our outcome
variables either show smaller partisan gaps or show no partisan gaps at all.
Across our seven outcome variables, we observed modestly sized partisan
differences on four items and no differences on three items. As shown in
Figure 4, the largest partisan difference was on whether chloroquine was
an approved treatment for COVID-19. Democrats reported being more
scared of COVID-19 than Republicans. In a question probing a trade-off
between public health and the economy, Republicans tilted towards protect-
ing the economy. Democrats reported being more likely to “stay at home”
than Republicans, though both reported high levels.
We did not find significant partisan differences on the remaining three
items. Democrats and Republicans reported similar levels of personal
agency in being able to help stop the spread of the coronavirus. Republicans
were just as likely as Democrats to believe that experts advised against using
ibuprofen.7 Both Republicans and Democrats expressed belief in asympto-
matic spread of COVID-19.
Discussion
In the analyses above, we showed that in the initial stage of the
pandemic there were large partisan divides on our treatment items
between Republicans and Democrats, questions designed to focus on
Trump’s handling of the pandemic and deliver a clear partisan cue in the
form of a tweet advocating keeping the economy open. However, on our
outcome measures, we consistently observed smaller differences than on
our treatment questions, if we observed a difference at all. We did not find
evidence for our expectation that emphasizing Trump creates or increases
the partisan divide, when present. These study results raise two interesting
questions: (1) why are there partisan differences on some COVID-19 questions
but not others?, and (2) what explains why our treatment had no effect?
We think the answers are related. We observe partisan differences on items
where there has been clear elite signaling, particularly from Trump. At the
beginning of the pandemic, Trump heavily promoted chloroquine as a possible
cure, downplayed the coronavirus as something to fear, and clearly pushed for
reopening the economy. Had our survey been fielded later when stay-at-home
measures were being introduced in some states, wemight also have seenmore
substantial partisan differences in willingness to stay at home. For the items
7Expert guidance about the use of ibuprofen for COVID-19 patients has changed over the course of the
pandemic (Moore et al. 2020). Our survey was fielded just after WHO reversed its guidance against
recommending the use of ibuprofen for COVID-19 patients.
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where there was partisan dissensus, the considerations we attempted to acti-
vate with our treatment may have been “activated” already (Druckman and
Leeper 2012). However, the gaps on our outcome measures were smaller
than our treatment items, suggesting that there was potential room to polarize.
Another possibility is that in the beginning stages of a severe global health
scare, accuracy motivations receive greater emphasize than (partisan) direc-
tional motivations. Without an ability to reliably measure directional versus
accuracy motivations at the individual level, it may be impossible to adjudicate
between these possibilities. Yet another explanation is that further polarization
on these items is indeed possible, but our treatment simply was not a strong
enough cue to activate partisans’ considerations; with a stronger partisan cues’
manipulation perhaps attitudes could have been shifted. Previous work has
found that partisan cues during the financial crisis did have an effect (Stoeckel
and Kuhn 2018).
At the same time, we did not observe partisan differences on items related
to one’s personal agency in stopping the coronavirus, whether ibuprofen
should be used with COVID-19 patients, and whether asymptomatic trans-
mission is possible. For these items, there was little (if any) elite dissensus
(if any messaging at all). Without providing specific information to respon-
dents about these issues, our treatment was unlikely to act as a cue and
was simply not powerful enough to alter responses. If people do not see
these particular facets of COVID-19 as partisan in the first place, our study
suggests there are important boundary conditions for how much emphasiz-
ing partisan considerations affects opinion.
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